La meva intenció en les pàgines següents és analitzar la teoria del llenguatge que es troba en el Cràtil de Plató. D'una banda, s'analitza la concepció del significat de les paraules quePlató sembla defensar en aquest diàleg; de l'altra, s'ocupa del problema dels orígens delllenguatge. Aquestes qüestions s'estudien en relació amb la perspectiva ontològica i epistemològicade Plató: essencialisme, teoria de la reminiscència i les tesis dels sofistes sobre laimpossibilitat de parlar amb falsedat. La conclusió és que en el Cràtil podem (...) trobar ja la preparació de la teoria del llenguatge que Plató necessitarà per a la seva ulterior teoria de les idees. (shrink)

In this paper a non-paradoxical interpretation of Hobbes’s defence of scientific realism of materialistic type is proposed. It attempts to explain how this author was able to defend the truth of materialism and at the same time to deny that it could be demonstrated in a metaphysical way. The key to his position depends on the metaphorical use of the concept of ‘imitation’ and the treatment of the infinite and irresistible power as the philosophically relevant attribute of God. So Hobbes’s (...) intention would consist of saying that the explanation, but not the demonstration, of the truth of materialism depends on the ontological parity and continuity between the world and the human being, in the way in which they are explained by empirical science. In this sense Hobbes’s project, very different to Descartes’s one, would be an attempt to naturalise the epistemology that yet is conscious of the metaphysical limits affecting the naturalistic proposals of philosophy. (shrink)

Este artículo se ocupa del problema de cuál pueda ser la naturaleza de la creencia y cuál la mejor explicación de su normatividad. Se analizan diversas teorías que desarrollan el modelo ¿estado más contenido¿, y se presenta como alternativa una concepción de filiación wittgensteiniana que entiende la creencia como acción simbólica y expresiva.

God and Phenomenology: Thinking with Jean-Yves Lacoste provides a starting point for scholars who seek to familiarize themselves with the work of this French phenomenologist and theologian. Thirteen international scholars comment on Lacoste's work. In conclusion the volume offers an unpublished essay by Lacoste on the topic of eschatology. / Table of Contents -- Introduction: Thinking with Jean-Yves Lacoste by Joeri Schrijvers and Martin Koci / Part I: Critiques -- 1. "'Children of the World': A Note on Jean-Yves Lacoste," by (...) Kevin Hart / 2. "Lacoste on Appearing and Reduction," by Steven DeLay / 3. "Reduction Without Appearance: The Non-Phenomenality of God," by Robert C. Reed / 4. "Only Metaphysics Sustains Phenomenology," by John Milbank / Part II: Commentaries -- 5. "Canonical Texts," by Oliver O'Donovan / 6. "Reading Prayerfully Before God: Jean-Yves Lacoste's Treatment of Lectio Divina as an Instance of Existence Coram Deo," by Christina M. Gschwandtner / 7. "Affection, Mood, and Poetry: Overcoming Mentalism," by Joseph Rivera / 8. "Rejecting the Wrong Questions: Jean-Yves Lacoste's Resistance to a Philosophical-Theological Divide," by Stephanie Rumpza / Part III: Explorations -- 9. "For the Love of Revelation: Open and Relational Theology in Light of Lacoste," by Jason W. Alvis / 10. "Right Use, Right Thinking," by William C. Hackett / 11. "The Beautiful Life of Faith: A Liturgical Reading of Fear and Trembling," by Amber Bowen / 12. "In the Footsteps of Henri de Lubac and Gregory of Nyssa: Jean-Yves Lacoste on Human Becoming, Historical and Eternal," by Stephen E. Lewis / 13. "Kenosis and Transcendence: Jean-Yves Lacoste and Soren Kierkegaard on the Phenomenality of God," by Nikolaas Cassidy-Deketelaere / In Conclusion -- 14. "The Final Word: Prolegomena to Eschatology," by Jean-Yves Lacoste. (shrink)

This book explores Caputo's proposal for a radical theology of our time. Philosophers and theologians from within Europe respond to Caputo's attempt to configure a less rigid, less dogmatic form of religion. These scholars, in turn, receive responses by Caputo, thereby strengthening the development of radical theology in Europe and abroad.

Call a bit of scientific discourse a description of a missing system when (i) it has the surface appearance of an accurate description of an actual, concrete system (or kind of system) from the domain of inquiry, but (ii) there are no actual, concrete systems in the world around us fitting the description it contains, and (iii) that fact is recognised from the outset by competent practitioners of the scientific discipline in question. Scientific textbooks, classroom lectures, and journal articles abound (...) with such passages; and there is a widespread practice of talking and thinking as though there are systems which fit the descriptions they contain perfectly, despite the recognition that no actual, concrete systems do so—call this the face value practice. There are, furthermore, many instances in which philosophers engage in the face value practice whilst offering answers to epistemological and methodological questions about the sciences. Three questions, then: (1) How should we interpret descriptions of missing systems? (2) How should we make sense of the face value practice? (3) Is there a set of plausible answers to (1) and (2) which legitimates reliance on the face value practice in our philosophical work, and can support the weight of the accounts which are entangled with that practice? In this paper I address these questions by considering three answers to the first: that descriptions of missing systems are straightforward descriptions of abstract objects, that they are indirect descriptions of “property-containing” abstracta, and that they are (in a different way) indirect descriptions of mathematical structures. All three proposals are present in the literature, but I find them wanting. The result is to highlight the importance of developing a satisfactory understanding of descriptions of missing systems and the face value practice, to put pressure on philosophical accounts which rely on the practice, and to help us assess the viability of certain approaches to thinking about models, theory structure, and scientific representation. (shrink)

I offer an overview of the book, _Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life_, summarizing the main issues, arguments, and conclusions (Fischer 2020). I also present some new ideas and further developments of the material in the book. A big part of this essay is drawing connections between the specific issues treated in the book and those in other areas of philosophy, and in particular, the theory of agency and moral responsibility. I highlight some striking similarities of both structure and content (...) between the death/meaning in life literature and the free will/moral responsibility literature. (shrink)

A common argument against prostitution states that selling sex is harmful because it involves selling something deeply personal and emotional. More and more of us, however, believe that sexual encounters need not be deeply personal and emotional in order to be acceptable—we believe in the acceptability of casual sex. In this paper I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then we have few or no reasons to reject prostitution. I do so by first examining nine influential arguments to the (...) contrary. These arguments purport to pin down the alleged additional harm brought about by prostitution by appealing to various aspects of its practice, such as its psychology, physiology, economics and social meaning. For each argument I explain why it is unconvincing. I then weight the costs against the benefits of prostitution, and argue that, in sum, prostitution is no more harmful than a long line of occupations that we commonly accept without hesitation. (shrink)

In this article, we defend two claims about the precautionary principle. The first is that there is no ‘core’ precautionary principle that unifies all its different versions. It is more plausible to think of the different versions as being related to each other by way of family resemblances. So although precautionary principle x may have much in common with precautionary principle y, and y with z, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that unify all versions of the (...) principle. Our second claim is that it is sometimes appropriate to think of the precautionary principle as a midlevel principle in the sense proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, i.e. as a non-rigid moral principle. We argue that if the precautionary principle is conceived as a non-rigid principle that needs to be balanced against other principles before a moral verdict can be reached, then this enables us to address some standard objections to the principle. (shrink)

Sentence comprehension involves maintaining and continuously integrating linguistic information and, thus, makes demands on working memory. Past research has demonstrated that semantic WM, but not phonological WM, is critical for integrating word meanings across some distance and resolving semantic interference in sentence comprehension. Here, we examined the relation between phonological and semantic WM and the comprehension of center-embedded relative clause sentences, often argued to make heavy demands on WM. Additionally, we examined the relation between phonological and semantic WM and the (...) comprehension of transitive and dative active and passive sentences, which may also draw on WM resources depending on the number of propositions that must be maintained and the difficulty of processing passive clauses. In a large sample of individuals with aphasia, we assessed whether comprehension performance on more complex vs. simpler active-passive or embedded relative clause sentences would be predicted by semantic but not phonological WM when controlling for single word comprehension. For performance on the active-passive comprehension task, we found that semantic WM, but not phonological WM, predicted comprehension of dative sentences when controlling for comprehension of transitive sentences. We also found that phonological WM, but not semantic WM, predicted mean comprehension for reversible active-passive sentences when controlling for trials with lexical distractors. On the relative clause comprehension task, consistent with prior results, we found that semantic WM, but not phonological WM, predicted comprehension of object relative clause sentences and relative clause sentences with a passive construction. However, both phonological WM and semantic WM predicted mean comprehension across all relative clause types for reversible trials when controlling for trials with lexical distractors. While we found evidence of semantic WM’s role in comprehension, we also observed unpredicted relations between phonological WM and comprehension in some conditions. Post-hoc analyses provided preliminary evidence that phonological WM maintains a backup phonological representation of the sentence that may be accessed when sentence comprehension processing is less efficient. Future work should investigate possible roles that phonological WM may play across sentence types. (shrink)

On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of subsequentism, according to which the bad thing for the deceased, or the harm of death to the deceased, takes place after he or she has died. The main puzzle for this view is to explain how we can predicate a property at a time (such as having a misfortune or (...) being harmed) to an individual who does not exist at that time. This is the Problem of Predication. I consider alternative attempts to solve this puzzle, including one suggested by Ben Bradley, and I argue that they do not succeed. I go on to provide a new way of addressing the Problem of Predication and thus defending subsequentism against this specific threat, contrasting my approach with others currently on offer. (shrink)

The Consequence Argument is one of the leading arguments for the incompatibility of causal determinism and free will in the sense of freedom to do otherwise. Thus, it challenges “classical compatibilism” of the sort defended by many philosophers, such as Hume, Schlick, Ayer, Lehrer, Perry, Lewis, Vihvelin, et, al. David Lewis has offered what has become the most influential response: local-miracle compatibilism. I present a critique of this kind of response to the Consequence Argument. My critique shows that, although Lewis-style (...) local-miracle compatibilism may effectively address some versions of the Consequence Argument, it does not succeed in refuting others. My critique consists, in large part, in arguing for a new reconstruction of the principle of the fixity of the past - a principle that played a crucial role in the history of the debate and that has, in one form or another, been employed by many important historical figures. I will also show why Lewis’s famous views about our powers in time-travel are false. (shrink)

I explore two thought-experiments in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s important article, “A Defense of Abortion”: the violinist example and the people-seeds example. I argue (contra Thomson) that you have a moral duty not to unplug yourself from the violinist and also a moral duty not to destroy a people-seed that has landed in your sofa. Nevertheless, I also argue that there are crucial differences between the thought-experiments and the contexts of pregnancy due to rape or to contraceptive failure. In virtue of (...) these differences, it would not follow from my conclusions about the violinist and people-seeds cases that abortion would not be permissible in a case of rape or in a case of voluntary intercourse with contraceptive failure. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to examine critically Julian Savulescu's claim that people should select, of the possible children they could have, the one who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available genetic information, including information about non‐disease genes. I argue here that in defending this moral obligation, Savulescu has neglected several important issues such as access to selection technologies, disproportionate burdens on women, (...) difficulties in determining what is best, problems with aggregate effects of individual choices, and questions about social justice. Taking these matters into account would call such a moral requirement into serious question. (shrink)

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible, unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that we can (...) see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned (even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own account. (shrink)

This paper reviews moral and cultural assessments which led to the definition of brain death and calls for a similar normative consensus regarding the moral recognition and legal protection of embryonal life related to criteria of brain life. This paper differentiates between cortical brain life I, i.e., the first existence of post-mitotic stationary neurons forming the early cortical plate (54th day post conception), and cortical brain life II, i.e., the beginning of cortical neuro-neuronal synapses (after the 70th day p.c.). The (...) latter are preconditional for establishing the communicative network within the cortex and with subcortical structures. The paper conservatively calls for a tentative moral consensus that could recognize brain life I, i.e., the 54th day p.c., as a stage prior to which embryo research generally would be acceptable in accordance with principles similar to those which led to the acceptance of brain death. Other developmental stages such as fertilization, nidation, viability, as well as the ‘potentiality’ principle are less significant for the moral recognition of early human life. Keywords: brain death, brain life, embryo research, embryonal tissue CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Previously, I have argued that moral responsibility for actions is associated with guidance control. This sort of control does not necessarily involve the freedom to do otherwise. In this paper I extend the view to apply to omissions. That is, moral responsibility for an omission is associated with guidance control of that omission. This helps to provide a systematic, unified account of moral responsibility.

According to the Norwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe, human life is filled with so much suffering that procreation is morally impermissible. In the first part of this paper I present Zapffe’s pessimism-based argument for anti-natalism, and contrast it with the arguments for anti-natalism proposed by Arthur Schopenhauer and David Benatar. In the second part I explore what Zapffe’s pessimism can teach us about biomedical enhancement. I make the case that pessimism counts in favor of pursuing biomedical enhancements. The reason is (...) that the worse we take the baseline human condition to be, the stronger are our reasons to try to alter humanity, and the weaker are our reasons to fear technology-driven extinction. The prospect of enhancement, I further argue, gives pessimists a reason to reject anti-natalism. (shrink)

In a recent article, Alasdair Cochrane argues for the need to have an undignified bioethics. His is not, of course, a call to transform bioethics into an inelegant, pathetic discipline, or one failing to meet appropriate disciplinary standards. His is a call to simply eliminate the concept of human dignity from bioethical discourse. Here I argue that he fails to make his case. I first show that several of the flaws that Cochrane identifies are not flaws of the conceptions of (...) dignity he discusses but rather flaws of his, often problematic, understanding of such conceptions. Second, I argue that Cochrane's case against the concept of human dignity goes too far. I thus show that were one to agree that these are indeed flaws that require that we discard our ethical concepts, then following Cochrane's recommendations would commit us not only to an undignified bioethics, i.e. a bioethics without dignity, but to a bioethics without much ethics at all. (shrink)

Suppose I assert “Jim is rich”. According to negotiated contextualism, my assertion should be understood as a proposal to adopt a standard of wealth such that Jim counts as “rich” by that standard. Furthermore, according to negotiated contextualism, this is so in virtue of the semantic properties of the word “rich”. Defenders of negotiated contextualism (Khoo & Knobe in Noûs 52(1):109–143, 2016; Khoo in Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 100(1):26–53, 2020) claim that this view is uniquely well-placed to account for certain disagreement (...) data; for example, that if your standard for the application of the word “rich” is more constraining than mine, you can sensibly assert “no, Jim is not rich” without thereby making an incompatible claim. This paper outlines a simpler explanation of the data: speakers can sensibly reject a given assertion provided that they think that the asserted sentence is false in the context which they take to be relevant to that sentence’s interpretation. I argue that, combined with standard semantic tools, this explanation can account for the original data and for new empirical results. Along the way, I present new empirical data to argue against negotiated contextualism. (shrink)

Current developments in biomedicine are presenting us with difficult ethical decisions and raising complex policy questions about how to regulate these new developments. Particularly vexing for governments have been issues related to human embryo experimentation. Because some of the most promising biomedical developments, such as stem cell research and nuclear somatic transfer, involve such experimentation, several international bodies have drafted documents aimed to provide guidance to governments when developing biomedical science policy. Here I focus on two such documents: the Council (...) of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being and the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being.I argue that by using human dignity as a criterion to determine the permissibility of particular human embryo research practices, these documents cannot aid in identifying research that would be contrary to human dignity. Thus, they fail to guide public policy on embryo experimentation. Their use of human dignity as a criterion makes their task of offering guidance unfeasible because the concept as used in these documents is too vague and is applied in contradictory ways. I discuss the main goals of these documents and their claims in relation to human embryo research. I then discuss how they have influenced public policy in several countries. Finally, I show that although these Council of Europe treaties attempt to serve as public policy guides in the area of embryo research, they fail to do so. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend (...) itself to theories of mind such as Noë’s that emphasize the ways in which sense-making occurs outside the head. But while Derrida’s notion of “contamination” rightly points to an indeterminateness of meaning in an outside, extended, concrete lived world, he ultimately reduces meaning to a structure of signification. This casts indeterminateness in terms of absence, ignoring the presence of non-linguistic phenomena of embodied sense-making central to both the contemporary enactivist program and to the later Husserl, who is able to account for the indeterminateness of meaning in lived experience through his distinction between sense and more exact linguistic meaning. Husserl’s transcendental theory of meaning also allows for a substantive contribution to sense-making from the side of the perceived object—an aspect missing from Noë’s account. Thus, in contrast to Derrida and to Noë, Husserl accounts for sense-making in terms of both the lived body and the lived world. (shrink)

El materialismo de la Edad Moderna nos describe al hombre como una máquina, comparable a un complejo artilugio mecánico. Cabe entonces imaginar que una máquina no-biológica pueda constituir un ser pensante como lo son los seres humanos, e incluso cabría pensar en la posibilidad de codificación de una mente humana real para su posterior trasvase a un sustrato artificial. Considero que estas últimas posiciones son más propias de la cultura friki o de amantes de la ciencia ficción que de una (...) cultura humanista seria. En cualquier caso, una cosa parece clara: la simulación por ordenador de cualquier tipo de materia no es la materia misma. Una simulación por ordenador de una estrella no emite luz ni calor, y del mismo modo tampoco ofrece calor humano (en términos materiales) ni voluntad de vivir una máquina que hipotéticamente pueda contener toda la información sobre el ser humano y simular sus respuestas. -/- English translation: The materialism of the Modern Age describes human beings as machines, comparable to complex mechanical devices. It is then possible to imagine that a non-biological machine can constitute a thinking being as humans are, and one could even think of the possibility of coding a real human mind for its subsequent transfer to an artificial substrate. I think that these latter positions are more typical of the geek culture or of science fiction lovers than of a serious humanist culture. In any case, one thing seems clear: the computer simulation of any type of matter is not the matter itself. A computer simulation of a star does not emit light or heat, and likewise a machine that hypothetically can contain all the information about a human being and simulate his/her responses offers neither human heat (in material terms) nor will to live. (shrink)

Metaphysical considerations aside, today’s inheritors of the tradition of natural philosophy are primarily scientists. However, they are oblivious to the human factor involved in science and in seeing how political, religious, and other ideologies contaminate our visions of nature. In general, philosophers observe human (historical, sociological, and psychological) processes within the construction of theories, as well as in the development of scientific activity itself. -/- In our time, feminism—along with accompanying ideas of identity politics under the slogan “diversity, inclusion, equity”—has (...) emerged in science policies. The vast majority of scientists (including myself) are convinced that discrimination is reprehensible. We also believe that all individuals of any sex, race, ethnic group, or ideology should be valued in academia solely based on his or her merits and potential through equality programs. However, as I will show in this article, political indoctrination has inadmissibly undertaken the struggle for equality in academic institutions in Western countries. I argue here that universities and research institutes should be politically free (neutral) to encourage academic freedom. -/- One negative aspect of equality programs is that worldwide, scientists are harassed for expressing opinions related to the “gender” issue. This situation severely restricts scientists’ freedom of expression, even within the limits of the law. Codes of conduct extending beyond legal boundaries are examples of this issue. Scientists who express their views about “gender” are often harassed, bullied, and socially or academically excluded. Thus, we are witnessing a wave of proselytizing in research institutes and science-associated media. Today, there is widespread biased propaganda of “victimhood”. This propaganda proposes positive discrimination and increasing women’s participation in unnatural ways. It also bends the history of science by overvaluing the creations of forgotten women, offering lectures on indoctrination, organizing congresses on gender and science, and persecuting anyone who sees the subject differently. All of this covered by a multitude of associations that financially benefit from these discourses through succulent subsidies of public money. Apparently, feminism is no longer about fighting against discrimination. Instead, it is about imposing an ideology and giving more power to one group of people. Thus, we must ask whether the end justifies the means. (shrink)

I compare the discussion on exclusivism in religion to the discussion on exclusivism in general. With defenders of religious exclusivism, such as Plantinga, I argue that it is a subset of general exclusivism and is as little blameworthy as the latter is. This explains why defenders of religious exclusivism are right in assuming that the burden of proof is on the shoulders of the critics of exclusivism. Yet, this answer solves only part of the problem. It answers only the first (...) order question of whether it is legitimate to hold exclusivist truth claims in religion. It does not answer the second order question of how, in what spirit, they should be held. I argue that there are contexts in which exclusivist truth claims should be held in a humble fashion, for example contexts in which (cognitive) ambiguity reigns. If they are held in those contexts in an overconfident fashion, they are epistemically and/or morally blameworthy. Since religion is characterized by a measure of (cognitive) ambiguity, exclusivist religious truth claims should be held in a humble fashion. They are thus blameworthy if held in an overconfident fashion. Yet, if held in a modest spirit, there is nothing wrong with religious exclusivism. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss Abraham Joshua Heschel’s influence in the Chinese-reading world by focusing on the growing list of publications about, and translations of, his works in Chinese. By examinin...

Scientists, the medical profession, philosophers, social scientists, policy makers, and the public at large have been quick to embrace the accomplishments of genetic science. The enthusiasm for the new biotechnologies is not unrelated to their worthy goal. The belief that the new genetic technologies will help to decrease human suffering by improving the public’s health has been a significant influence in the acceptance of technologies such as genetic testing and screening. But accepting this end should not blind us to the (...) need for an evaluation of whether a particular means is adequate to achieve it. Lack of such evaluation notwithstanding, discussions of the ethical, legal, and social implications have tended to presuppose that the development and implementation of genetic testing will be an appropriate means to reduce human suffering in significant ways. I argue here that such an assumption is mistaken. In part this is the case because human biology is more complex than sometimes it is made to appear in these debates. But, the idea that human suffering resulting from disease can be reduced in significant ways with the use of genetic testing also ignores the social contexts in which these technologies are being developed and implemented. (shrink)

I argue here that critics of biological explanations of human nature are mistaken when they maintain that the truth of genetic determinism implies the end of critical evaluation and reform of our social institutions. Such a claim erroneously presupposes that our social values, practices, and institutions have nothing to do with what makes biological explanations troublesome. What constitutes a problem for those who are concerned with social justice is not the fact that particular behaviors might be genetically determined, but the (...) fact that our value system and social institutions create the conditions that make such behaviors problematic. (shrink)

Although Barsalou is right in identifying the importance of perceptual symbols as a means of carrying certain kinds of content, he is wrong in playing down the inferential resources available to amodal symbols. I argue that the case for perceptual symbol systems amounts to a false dichotomy and that it is feasible to help oneself to both kinds of content as extreme ends on a content continuum. The continuum thesis I advance argues for the inferential content at one end and (...) perceptual content at the other. In between the extremes, symbols might have aspects that are either perceptual or propositional-linguistic in character. I argue that this way of characterising the issue preserves the good sense of Barsalou's recognition of perceptual representations and yet avoids the tendency to minimise the gains won with symbolic representations vital to contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

This thesis is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal (...) holds that experiential content is necessarily under¬pinned by sophisticated cognitive influences. My alternative, the continuum theory, holds that these influences are relevant to experience only at certain levels of organisation and that at other levels there are contents which such features do not capture at all. Central to my account is that there are degrees to which cognitive influences affect experiential content; indeed, for the most part, experience is an amalgam of both inferential and non-inferential features. I claim that the inferentialist proposal is fundamentally flawed and deserves replacement, and I argue that my alternative fills the hollow that remains. The thesis is divided into four sections. In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce two traditionally rival views of experiential content. In Chapter 2, I develop my continuum alternative. Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between experience and language, while Chapter 4 explores the relationship between beliefs and experience. The overall argument is that it has been a mistake to understand experience simply in inferential or non-inferential terms. In Part II, I examine the structure of mental content. Chapter 5 is concerned with the kinds of experiences which escape the inferentialist analysis. Chapter 6 considers Kant’s metaphysic of experience counterpointed to Lorenz’s reading of his work in the light of evolutionary biology. Chapter 7 treats animal experience in relation to the continuum view I am developing, while Chapter 8 reviews Fodor’s contribution to perceptual psychology. It is argued that the view of experiential content being developed is both consistent with empirical data on informationally local perceptual sub-systems, but also accords well with evolutionary theory and a naturalist interpretation of Kant’s taxonomy. Part III deals with inferentialism in the philosophy of science. In Chapter 9, I assess the theory dependence of observation thesis as it is advanced by Paul Feyerabend. I bring out of his account a subtle confusion concerning the importance of inference in the context of scientific inquiry. Part IV deals with the issue of experience in the philosophy of mind. In Chapter 10, I look at Wilfred Sellars’s attack on sense data theories. Chapter 11 confronts Paul Churchland’s treatment of ‘folk psychology’ while Chapter 12 isolates the issue of experiential qualia and the position of property dualism. I offer a critical review of Thomas Nagel’s work in this chapter and claim that his position can be read in a way which is consistent with the continuum account I am developing. I conclude the thesis in the usual fashion with a summary of the central claims. (shrink)

Credibility is particularly important in organic food systems because there are only marginal visual and sensorial differences between organic and conventionally produced products, requiring consumers to trust in producers’ quality claims. In this article I explore what challenges the credibility of organic food systems and I explore how credibility of organic food systems can be maintained, using the Danish organic food system as a case study. The question is increasingly relevant as the sale of organic food is growing in Denmark (...) as well as globally, and consumers’ expectations of organics continuously evolve. The inquiry is threefold, first I outline a conceptual framework for understanding trust and credibility in the food system, secondly I explore the developments in Danish organic food systems and thirdly discuss the challenges and opportunities for maintaining trust in the Danish organic food system. In the analysis I indicate eight key challenges: unrealistic expectations, blind trust and little motivation for extending their knowledge, consumers assess the overall credibility of organic products, ambitious ethical principles, new consumer groups introduce new expectations, frozen requirements in a changing world, growing imports and labelling and multiple versions of organics and the diversity is growing, as well as four aspects which may maintain the credibility of organics if implemented: coordinate expectations, communicate requested information, institutional reform and open communication of pros and cons of organic production. (shrink)

The present paper has the purpose of making a critical approach of the so called “independence thesis” (Unabhängigkeitsthese) between Law and Ethics based on the Kantian text about equity in his Doctrine of Law. To this critical approach, a weakening of the “independence thesis” is demonstrated according to some endogenous concepts of the Kant work, which we believe deals with an oblique opening of the Kantian’s law to ethics. To demonstrate this, we follow a methodological analytic way divided in three (...) moments: (i) an analysis of the concept of law in Kant; (ii) an explanatory approach of the “independence thesis”; and (iii) a critical approach of the “independence thesis”. (shrink)

Prior research suggests that interviewers play an important role in representing their organization and in making the interview a pleasant experience for applicants. This study examined whether impression management used by interviewers (organization-enhancement and applicant-enhancement) is perceived by applicants, and how it influences applicants’ attitudes, intentions, and emotions. Adopting a signaling perspective, this article argues that applicants’ positive attitudes and intentions towards the organization increase if interviewers not only enhance the organization, but if the signals they sent (i.e., organization-enhancement) are (...) actually received by the applicant. Similarly, applicants’ positive emotions should increase if interviewers not only enhance the applicant, but if the signals they send (i.e., applicant-enhancement) are actually received by the applicant. A field study which involved video coding interviewers’ impression management behavior during 153 selection interviews and pre- and post-interview applicant surveys showed that the signals sent by interviewers during the interview were received by applicants. In addition, applicants rated the organization’s prestige and their own positive affect after the interview more positively when they perceived higher levels of organization-enhancement during the interview. Furthermore, applicants reported more positive affect and interview self-efficacy after the interview when they perceived higher levels of interviewer applicant-enhancement. We also found an indirect effect of interviewers’ organization-enhancement on organizational prestige through applicants’ perceptions of organization-enhancement as well as indirect effects of interviewers’ applicant-enhancement on applicants’ positive affect and interview self-efficacy through applicants’ perceptions of applicant-enhancement. Our findings contribute to an integrated understanding of the effects of interviewer impression management and point out both risks and chances in selling and smooth-talking towards applicants. (shrink)

I argue here that first person speech on sexual violence remains an important dimension of the movement for social change in regard to sexual violence, and that the public speech of survivors faces at least three groups of obstacles: 1) the problem of epistemic injustice, that is, injustice in the sphere of knowledge 2) the problem of language and power, and 3) the problem of dominant discourses. I explain and develop these points and end with a final argument concerning the (...) critical importance of speaking publicly on these areas of human experience. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, “Destinism,” Andrew Bailey presents a puzzle for “Destinism,” the view that the only things we can do are those we in fact do. The puzzle is intriguing and important in part because it challenges a doctrine that many philosophers think could be true compatibly with our being morally responsible. Destinism is at least a viable view. Bailey’s puzzle derives from very plausible assumptions, but I argue that these assumptions are not as plausible as (...) they appear. Interpreted in a way that renders one of them acceptable makes another problematic. There is no one interpretation on which the puzzling arguments are uncontrovertibly sound. (shrink)

. In a number of papers I have sought to discuss and cast some doubt on a certain strategy of response to an argument that purports to show that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. This argument proceeds from the alleged ‘fixity of the past’ to the conclusion that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. William Lane Craig has criticized my approach to these issues. Here I should like to respond to some of Craig's claims. My goal is (...) to attempt to achieve a clearer, more penetrating view of some of the issues pertaining to the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. The focus here will be on a strategy of response to the incompatibilist's argument which is associated with William of Ockham. (shrink)

I argue that we can interpret the stories told by near-death experiences in a naturalistic way. Thus, the profound significance of NDEs need not come from a supernaturalistic conception of them, according to which in an NDE the individual is in touch with a heavenly realm. We can respect the sincerity of NDE reports, but we can capture their meaning in a naturalistic framework.

First, I discuss cross-cultural evidence showing that a good deal of enculturation takes place outside of thinking through other minds. Second, I review evidence challenging the claim that humans seek to minimize entropy. Finally, I argue that optimality claims should be avoided, and that descriptive Bayesianism offers a more promising avenue for the development of a Bayesian theory of culture.

In this article, evidentialism is refuted by relying on William James’ article ‘The Will to Believe’. After an introduction into the notion of ‘evidentialism’ and James’ attack on it , I distinguish between two sorts of evidentialisms, truth-oriented evidentialism and quiescent evidentialism . In 2.3–2.5, I criticize these forms of evidentialism on the grounds that the first has very limited applicability and the second leads to absurd consequences when applied in the moral domain. In section 3, the evidentialist challenge to (...) religion is refuted by arguing that, first, truth-oriented evidentialism is of only very limited applicability for criticizing religion and second, that quiescent evidentialism cannot be applied in certain situations , particular religious claims being among them. (shrink)

pt. I. Metaphysical theories.--pt. II. Factualism.--pt. III. A new approach.

I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I (...) hope to address more of the issues in future work. (shrink)

Professor Strawson was interviewed on video on location at King's College, London during the Spring of 1992. Professor Strawson discusses his thoughts on a variety of topics on which he has written previously, providing some illuminating insights into how his thoughts has progressed. The text published here is en excerpt from this interview, translated with kind permission of Mr Rudolf V. Fara, the producer, in which prof. Strawson discusses his philosophical views with Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy at (...) Oxford University, and Mark Sainsbury, Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy at King's College, University of London. (shrink)

I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I (...) hope to address more of the issues in future work. (shrink)

I argue that all that is relevant to appreciating art as art is the "abstract entity that is the work of art." The object of aesthetic contemplation, the bearer of aesthetic value, just is this abstract entity picked out by the sortal concept 'work of art,' which requires some vehicle but does not require the particular vehicle that is the original painting. Since this is so, the work of art is present in a visually-indistinguishable duplicate to the same extent and (...) to the same degree as it is in the original. To hedge my bets a little against those who are not persuaded by this strong claim, I also argue that, assuming there is a genuine value-relevant difference between an original and a duplicate, the duplicate could in principle share in or exceed the value of the original.. (shrink)

Zonulin is a physiological modulator of intercellular tight junctions, which upregulation is involved in several diseases like celiac disease (CeD). The polyQ gliadin fragment binds to the CXCR3 chemokine receptor that activates zonulin upregulation, leading to increased intestinal permeability in humans. Here, we report a general hypothesis based on the structural connection between the polyQ sequence of the immunogenic CeD protein, gliadin, and enteric coccidian parasites proteins. Firstly, a novel interaction pathway between the parasites and the host is described based (...) on the structural similarities between polyQ gliadin fragments and the parasite proteins. Secondly, a potential connection between coccidial infections as a novel environmental trigger of CeD is hypothesized. Therefore, this report represents a promising breakthrough for coccidian research and points out the potential role of coccidian parasites as a novel trigger of CeD that might define a preventive strategy for gluten‐related disorders in general. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/oMaQasStcFI. (shrink)